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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
Larry Severson appeals from the judgment denying his petition for post-
conviction relief. Severson contends the district court erred in summarily dismissing 
his claim that counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the prosecutor's closing 
argument. 
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings 
In 2004, a jury convicted Severson of the first-degree murder of his wife, 
Mary, and of poisoning her food and/or medicine. State v. Severson, 147 Idaho 694, 
700-701, 215 P.3d 414, 420-421 (2009). The court imposed a fixed life sentence for 
murder and five years for poisoning. !9..:, 147 Idaho at 701, 215 P.3d at 421. The 
Idaho Supreme Court affirmed Severson's convictions. !9..:, 147 Idaho at 723, 215 
P.3d at 443. 
Severson filed a timely petition for post-conviction relief. (R., pp.4-9.) The 
court entered a notice of intent to summarily dismiss some of Severson's claims and 
appointed counsel to represent Severson. (R., pp.19-27, 34-37.) Severson, with the 
assistance of counsel, subsequently filed an amended petition and the state filed an 
answer. (R., pp.52-62, 67-85.) The state also filed two motions for partial summary 
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dismissal. 1 (R., p.112; Motion for Order Granting Partial Summary Dismissal, filed 
February 13, 2012 ("First Motion") (Augmentation).) The district court summarily 
dismissed all claims raised by Severson with the exception of his claim that counsel 
was ineffective for failing or refusing to have Severson testify at trial, which claim the 
court dismissed after an evidentiary hearing. (R., pp.114-147, 151-159, 211-235.) 
The court entered Judgment, from which Severson filed a timely notice of appeal. 
(R., pp.237-241.) 
1 It appears the state had to file two motions for summary dismissal because, after 
the state filed its first motion in response to Severson's amended petition, Severson 
advised the court that the claims in his amended petition were "in addition to the 
claims in the original petition." (R., pp.112, 114.) Thus, the state's second motion 
sought dismissal "of the claims raised in Severson's initial petition with the exception 
of Severson's claim that trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing or 
refusing to permit Severson to testify in his own defense at trial" (R., p.112) whereas 
the state's first motion sought dismissal of all claims "raised in Severson's amended 
petition" with the same exception (First Motion (Augmentation).) 
2 
ISSUES 
Severson states the issues on appeal as: 
1. Did the district court err in summarily denying the claim of 
ineffective assistance of counsel in not objecting to prosecutorial 
misconduct at trial based upon the doctrine of res judicata when the 
issue before the Idaho Supreme Court in direct appeal was whether 
the prosecutorial misconduct was fundamental error and the claim in 
post-conviction was ineffective assistance of counsel which is 
controlled by the Strickland analysis of whether defense counsel's 
performance was deficient and if so whether the deficiency was 
prejudicial? 
2. Did Mr. Severson raise a genuine issue of material fact as to 
whether he was denied effective assistance of counsel by counsels' 
failure to object to prosecutorial misconduct in the State's closing 
arguments? 
(Opening Brief of Appellant ("Appellant's Brief'), pp.4-5.) 
The state rephrases the issue as: 
Has Severson failed to show the district court erred in summarily dismissing 
his claim that counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the prosecutor's closing 
argument? 
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ARGUMENT 
Severson Has Failed To Show Error In The Summary Dismissal Of His Claim That 
Counsel Was Ineffective For Failing To Object To The Prosecutor's Closing 
Argument 
A. Introduction 
Severson raises two arguments in relation to the district court's summary 
dismissal of his claim that counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the 
prosecutor's closing argument. First, Severson asserts the district court erred in 
dismissing this claim as res judicata. (Appellant's Brief, pp.6-7.) Second, Severson 
contends he raised a genuine issue of material fact entitling him to an evidentiary 
hearing on this claim. (Appellant's Brief, pp.16-17.) Both of Severson's arguments 
fail. Review of the applicable legal standards shows the district court correctly 
dismissed Severson's claim that counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the 
prosecutor's closing argument. 
B. Standard Of Review 
On appeal from summary dismissal of a post-conviction petition, the appellate 
court reviews the record to determine if a genuine issue of material fact exists, 
which, if resolved in the applicant's favor, would entitle the applicant to the requested 
relief. Matthews v. State, 122 Idaho 801, 807, 839 P.2d 1215, 1221 (1992); 
Aeschliman v. State, 132 Idaho 397, 403, 973 P.2d 749, 755 (Ct. App. 1999). 
Appellate courts freely review whether a genuine issue of material fact exists. 
Edwards v. Conchemco. Inc., 111 Idaho 851, 852, 727 P.2d 1279, 1280 (Ct. App. 
1986). 
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C The District Court Correctly Concluded Severson Was Not Entitled To An 
Evidentiary Hearing On His Claim That Counsel Was Ineffective For Failing 
To Object To The Prosecutor's Closing Argument 
Idaho Code § 19-4906 authorizes summary dismissal of an application for 
post-conviction relief in response to a party's motion or on the court's own initiative. 
"To withstand summary dismissal, a post-conviction applicant must present evidence 
establishing a prima facie case as to each element of the claims upon which the 
applicant bears the burden of proof." State v. Lovelace, 140 Idaho 53, 72, 90 P.3d 
278, 297 (2003) (citing Pratt v. State, 134 Idaho 581, 583, 6 P.3d 831, 833 (2000)). 
Thus, a claim for post-conviction relief is subject to summary dismissal pursuant to 
I.C. § 19-4906 "if the applicant's evidence raises no genuine issue of material fact" 
as to each element of petitioner's claims. Workman v. State, 144 Idaho 518, 522, 
164 P.3d 798, 802 (2007) (citing I.C. § 19-4906(b), (c)); Lovelace, 140 Idaho at 72, 
90 P.3d at 297. When a post-conviction petitioner alleges ineffective assistance of 
counsel, in order to survive summary dismissal of his petition, he must specifically 
allege that "(1) a material issue of fact exists as to whether counsel's performance 
was deficient, and (2) a material issue of fact exists as to whether the deficiency 
prejudiced the applicant's case." Baldwin v. State, 145 Idaho 148, 153-54, 177 P.3d 
362, 367-68 (2008) (internal citations omitted). "To establish deficient assistance, 
the burden is on the petitioner to show that his attorney's conduct fell below an 
objective standard of reasonableness. This objective standard embraces a strong 
presumption that trial counsel was competent and diligent." 19..: "[S]trategic or 
tactical decisions will not be second-guessed on appeal unless those decisions are 
based on inadequate preparation, ignorance of relevant law, or other shortcomings 
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capable of objective evaluation." 1fL. ''To establish prejudice, the claimant must 
show a reasonable probability that but for his attorney's deficient performance the 
outcome of the proceeding would have been different." 1fL. 
While a court must accept a petitioner's unrebutted allegations as true, the 
court is not required to accept either the applicant's mere conclusory allegations, 
unsupported by admissible evidence, or the applicant's conclusions of law. 
Workman, 144 Idaho at 522, 164 P.3d at 802 (citing Ferrier v. State, 135 Idaho 797, 
799, 25 P.3d 110, 112 (2001)). If the alleged facts, even if true, would not entitle the 
petitioner to relief, the trial court is not required to conduct an evidentiary hearing 
prior to dismissing the petition. 1fL. ( citing Stuart v. State, 118 Idaho 865, 869, 801 
P.2d 1216, 1220 (1990)). "Allegations contained in the application are insufficient for 
the granting of relief when (1) they are clearly disproved by the record of the original 
proceedings, or (2) do not justify relief as a matter of law." 1fL. A review of the record 
shows Severson failed to allege a genuine issue of material fact entitling him to an 
evidentiary hearing on his claim that counsel was ineffective for failing to object to 
the prosecutor's closing argument. 
On direct appeal, Severson asserted, inter alia, that the prosecutor engaged 
in misconduct during closing argument. Severson, 147 Idaho at 715, 215 P.3d at 
435. In considering this assertion, the Idaho Supreme Court noted "the standard of 
review governing claims of prosecutorial misconduct depends on whether the 
defendant objected to the misconduct at trial." 1fL. Where therers an objection, the 
appellate court "use[s] a two-part test to determine whether the misconduct requires 
reversal." 1fL. at 716, 215 P.3d at 436. "First, [the Court] ask[s) whether the 
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prosecutor's challenged action was improper." & (citation omitted). "If the conduct 
was improper, [the Court] then consider[s] whether the misconduct prejudiced the 
defendant's right to a fair trial or whether it was harmless." & (quotations and 
citation omitted). If the defendant cannot establish prejudice, "the misconduct will be 
regarded as harmless error." & (citation omitted). 
Where there is no objection, the claim is reviewed for fundamental error. 
Severson, 147 Idaho at 716, 215 P.3d at 436. When the Idaho Supreme Court 
issued the opinion in Severson, misconduct would be considered fundamental error 
if it went "to the foundation of the case or [took] from the defendant a right which was 
essential to his defense and which no court could or ought to permit him to waive."2 
& (quotations and citations omitted). Further, even if the misconduct resulted in 
fundamental error, the conviction will remain intact unless the Court is "convinced 
beyond a reasonable doubt that the same result would have been reached by the 
jury had the prosecutorial misconduct not occurred." Severson, 147 Idaho at 716, 
215 P.3d at 436. 
2 The year after it issued Severson, the Idaho Supreme Court restated the 
fundamental error standard of review applicable to unobjected to claims of error and 
"expressly disavowed [the] definition of 'fundamental error'" that was recited in 
Severson. State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 227, 245 P.3d 961, 979 (2010). The test 
for unobjected to fundamental error the Court adopted in Perry requires (1) the 
defendant to "demonstrate that one or more of [his] unwaived constitutional rights 
were violated"; (2) "the error must be clear or obvious, without the need for any 
additional information not contained in the appellate record, including information as 
to whether the failure to object was a tactical decision"; and (3) "the defendant must 
demonstrate that the error affected [his] substantial rights, meaning (in most 
instances) that it must have affected the outcome of the trial proceedings." 150 
Idaho at 226, 245 P.3d at 978. 
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With respect to the prosecutor's closing argument, Severson specifically 
complained that the prosecutor "improperly commented on his failure to testify, 
about Mary speaking from her grave, and about Mary's family." Severson, 147 
Idaho at 718, 215 P.3d at 438. Because Severson did not object to any of these 
arguments, the Idaho Supreme Court analyzed his claim under the foregoing 
fundamental error standard, addressing each complaint separately. 
First, the Court considered Severson's argument that he suffered a Fifth 
Amendment violation as a result of the "prosecutor's statement that '[t]his Is a 
circumstantial case, because nobody was in that house that night but Mary and 
Larry. Nobody knows, that has testified, what happened between them." Severson, 
147 Idaho at 718, 215 P.3d at 438 (quotations, brackets and emphasis original).) 
The Court rejected Severson's argument, concluding he "failed to prove the 
prosecutor's statement was an impermissible comment on his silence that 
constituted fundamental error." .!.st, 147 Idaho at 719, 215 P.3d at 439. 
Next the Court considered Severson's complaint about the "prosecutor's 
statements regarding Mary speaking from her grave." Severson, 147 Idaho at 719, 
215 P.3d at 439. The Court found that although the "statements that Mary was 
speaking from her grave were somewhat inflammatory because they were likely 
designed to appeal to the sympathies and passions of the jury," the comments did 
not "rise to the level of fundamental error." .!.st The Court also noted the "statements 
were simply referring to Mary's body providing evidence about the circumstances 
surrounding her death, not to her calling out for Severson's conviction" and 
concluded that "[b)ecause the statements did not result in an unfair trial or deprive 
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Severson of due process, they were not fundamental error." .!ft, 147 Idaho at 720, 
215 P.3d at 440. 
Finally, the Court considered Severson's unpreserved claim related to the 
"prosecutor's references to Mary's family." Severson, 147 Idaho at 720, 215 P.3d at 
440. With respect to this claim, the Court held: 
The prosecutor's references to Mary's family, while arguably 
improper, did not constitute fundamental error. The statements were 
not dwelled upon or made in support of an argument that Severson 
receive a harsher punishment. Instead, the statements merely 
reiterated evidence that had been produced at trial. Moreover, the trial 
court instructed the jury on several occasions that the prosecutor's 
arguments were not to be regarded as evidence. The statements did 
not impact the fairness of Severson's trial or deprive him of due 
process and, therefore, were not fundamental error. 
Severson, 147 Idaho at 720, 215 P.3d at 440. 
Two Justices dissented from the majority opinion in Severson. The author of 
the dissent, Justice Warren Jones (who was joined by Justice Pro Tern Kidwell), 
"limited [his] dissent to comments made by the prosecutor during closing arguments 
and whether the accumulation of any alleged errors warrant reversal pursuant to the 
cumulative error doctrine." Severson, 147 Idaho at 723-724, 215 P.3d at 443-444. 
Justice Jones did "not find any one statement, in and of itself, sufficient to warrant 
reversal" but did "find a pattern of conduct where the prosecutor continually made 
arguments for the sole purpose of appealing to the passions and prejudices of the 
jury." .!ft, 147 Idaho at 724, 215 P.3d at 444. Justice Jones then quoted all 
statements from the closing argument he found "offensive" including statements "not 
specifically cited to by [Severson] in his brief." .!ft Justice Jones then stated: "I find 
the prosecutor's comment on Severson's right to remain silent the most egregious 
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and offensive of all comments made during closing arguments" and disagreed with 
the majority's view of the challenged statement. 19.:. at 726, 215 P.3d at 446. 
Regarding the prosecutor's references to Mary's family, Justice Jones again 
expressed disagreement with the majority, stating: 'The prosecutor's conduct used 
Mary's family as a means to convict Severson by appealing to the jury's passions 
and infringed on Severson's right to a fair trial." kt_, 147 Idaho at 727, 215 P.3d at 
447. Justice Jones concluded that, "[c]umulatively," the "errors taken as a whole 
were not harmless" even though, in his opinion, there was "substantial evidence 
supporting the guilty verdict." kt_, 147 Idaho at 728-729, 215 P.3d at 448-449. 
In his post-conviction petition, Severson latched on to the dissenting opinion 
from his direct appeal and claimed that opinion "establish[es] that [he] received 
ineffective assistance of counsel due to counsel's failure to object in the state's 
closing arguments." (R., p.61.) The state sought summary dismissal of this claim, 
asserting Severson "failed to meet his burden of establishing a prima facie case of 
deficient performance, much less prejudice." (Brief in Support of Respondent's 
Motion for Partial Summary Dismissal ("Brief'), p.41 (Augmentation).) With respect 
to the prejudice prong, the state also asserted that because Severson "failed to 
allege any prejudice relating to the prosecutor's closing argument beyond that 
identified by the dissent on direct appeal, the majority's contrary opinion finding no 
prejudice is dispositive of and is, in fact, res judicata as to the prejudice prong." 
(Brief, p.43.) In dismissing this claim, the district court stated: "The Supreme 
Court's finding that there was no fundamental error in the comments will not be 
relitigated here. When legal issues are decided in a criminal action on direct appeal, 
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the defendant is barred by the doctrine of res judicata from raising them again in a 
post-conviction relief proceeding." (R., p.144.) 
On appeal, Severson first contends the district court's res judicata finding was 
erroneous, arguing res judicata "does not apply because the issue before the 
appellate court was not the issue in post-conviction." (Appellant's Brief, p.6.) More 
specifically, Severson contends that because "the issue decided in the direct appeal 
is not identical to the issue in post-conviction, issue preclusion cannot apply" and "as 
the claim in direct appeal, prosecutorial misconduct, is not the same as the claim in 
post-conviction, ineffective assistance of counsel, claim preclusion cannot apply." 
(Appellant's Brief, p.7.) Thus, Severson concludes, "summary dismissal on the 
grounds of res judicata was erroneous." (Appellant's Brief, p.7.) Severson is 
incorrect. 
The state acknowledges that a substantive prosecutorial misconduct claim, 
such as the one Severson raised on direct appeal, is a different claim than a claim 
that counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the closing argument. However, 
both the substantive claim and the ineffective assistance of counsel claim involve 
resolution of the issue of prejudice. "[W]hen legal issues are decided in a criminal 
action on direct appeal, the defendant is barred by the doctrine of res judicata from 
raising them again in a post-conviction relief proceeding." State v. Creech, 132 
Idaho 1, 10 n.1, 966 P.2d 10 n.1 (1998) (citing State v. Beam, 115 Idaho 208,210, 
766 P.2d 678,680 (1988), and State v. Fetterly, 115 Idaho 231,233, 766 P.2d 701, 
703 (1998)). As noted, with respect to the substantive claim, the prejudice analysis 
was based on the harmless error doctrine, which allowed the Court to affirm 
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Severson's convictions "if the Court [was] convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that 
the same result would have been reached by the jury had the prosecutorial 
misconduct not occurred." Severson, 147 Idaho at 716, 215 P.3d at 436. To 
demonstrate prejudice on his ineffective assistance of counsel claim, Severson 
"must show a reasonable probability that, but for the attorney's deficient 
performance, the outcome of the trial would have been different." Murray v. State, 
2014 WL 1053308 *4 (Idaho 2014) (quotations and citation omitted). '"A reasonable 
probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome."' ~ 
(quoting Cullen v. Pinholster, 131 S.Ct. 1388, 1403 (2011 )). "To undermine 
confidence in the outcome requires a substantial, not just conceivable, likelihood of a 
different result." Murray at *4 (quotations and citation omitted). A review of the two 
standards reveals that the prejudice standard already applied by the Idaho Supreme 
Court on direct appeal is more stringent than the prejudice standard Severson would 
be required to prove his ineffective assistance of counsel claim. Since the Idaho 
Supreme Court already concluded beyond a reasonable doubt that any misconduct 
that occurred did not deprive Severson of a fair trial and that the jury would have still 
convicted Severson even absent any misconduct, Severson necessarily cannot 
meet his burden of showing a "reasonable probability" otherwise. The district court 
properly dismissed Severson's ineffective assistance of counsel claim on this basis. 
Severson also argues there was a genuine issue of material fact entitling him 
to an evidentiary hearing on his claim that counsel was ineffective for failing to object 
to the prosecutor's closing arguments. Again, Severson is incorrect. To survive 
summary dismissal, Severson was required to allege a prima facie case of both 
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deficient performance and prejudice. For the reasons already stated, Severson 
failed to do so with respect to the prejudice prong. He likewise failed to allege any 
facts sufficient to overcome the presumption that counsel's decision not to object 
was anything but a reasonable, tactical decision. Indeed, he alleged no facts 
whatsoever in this regard, instead resting his entire claim on his belief that the 
dissenting opinion on direct appeal "establish[es] that [he] received ineffective 
assistance of counsel due to counsel's failure to object in the state's closing 
arguments."3 (R., p.61.) That two dissenting Justices thought certain comments 
were objectionable does not, however, mean that counsel's decision not to object 
was anything but strategic, nor does it mean the comments were objectionable 
especially since the majority did not entirely agree. 
"The question is whether an attorney's representation amounted to 
incompetence under prevailing professional norms, not whether it deviated from best 
practices or most common custom." Premo v. Moore, 131 S.Ct. 733, 740 (2011) 
(citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 690 (1984)). "From a strategic 
perspective ... , many trial lawyers refrain from objecting during closing argument to 
all but the most egregious misstatements by opposing counsel on the theory that the 
jury may construe their objections to be a sign of desperation or hyper-technicality." 
United States v. Molina, 934 F.2d 1440, 1448 (9th Cir. 1991 ). A defense attorney 
may also decide not object because he believes the prosecutor's argument is helpful 
to his case or believes he can capitalize on the prosecutor's statements during his 
3 That Severson relies on the dissenting opinion as proof of his claim also makes his 
anti-res judicata argument seem somewhat ironic. 
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own closing argument. kL see also Lambert v. McBride, 365 F.3d 557, 564 (ih Cir. 
2004) ("Under Strickland, we must note that there may very well be strategic 
reasons for counsel not to object during closing arguments. Counsel may have 
been trying to avoid calling attention to the statements and thus giving them more 
force."); United States v. Daas, 198 F.3d 1167, 1179 (9th Cir. 1999) (counsel's 
decision not to object to the prosecutor's closing argument "falls within the range of 
permissible conduct of trial counsel"). "Whatever the actual explanation, Strickland 
requires [the Court] to 'indulge a strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls 
within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance."' Molina, 934 F.2d at 
1448 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689). "This presumption especially applies to 
silence in the face of allegedly improper arguments." Vicory v. State, 81 S.W.3d 
725, 731 (Mo. App. 2002) (citation omitted). 
Applying the foregoing standards to the question of whether Severson alleged 
a prima facie case of deficient performance in relation to the prosecutor's statements 
to which counsel did not object,4 it is clear he did not. First, as to the Fifth 
Amendment statement, the Idaho Supreme Court's conclusion that the statement did 
not violate Severson's Fifth Amendment right, although not made in the context of an 
ineffective assistance of counsel claim, supports the conclusion that counsel was not 
deficient for failing to object to the statement. If the statement did not violate 
4 Obviously, Severson's claim cannot encompass statements made by the 
prosecutor to which counsel did, in fact, object. On this point, it is notable that the 
dissent's conclusion that Severson was entitled to a new trial included such 
statements. Specifically, the statements about Severson having an affair and 
"screwing some 21-year-old tramp" were part of Severson's request for a new trial. 
(#32128 R., Vol. X, p.1802.) 
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Severson's rights - a finding that is also res judicata - there was nothing for counsel 
to object to and he was not deficient for failing to do so. 
Severson also failed to allege a prima facie case of deficient performance 
related to counsel's failure to object to the prosecutor's statement that "Mary still 
speaks to us today. She is telling us what happened that night and why she is dead 
.... Mary tells us, she speaks to us from her grave as to who killed her and why she 
died." Severson, 147 Idaho at 719, 215 P.3d at 413. As noted by the Idaho 
Supreme Court, although the statements were "somewhat inflammatory," "the 
statements were simply referring to Mary's body providing evidence about the 
circumstances surrounding her death, not to her calling out for Severson's 
conviction." kl_, 147 Idaho at 720, 215 P.3d at 440. Viewed this way, it was not 
objectively unreasonable for counsel not to object to this statement. This is 
especially true given the well-accepted principle that "both parties are [generally] 
given wide latitude in making their arguments to the jury and discussing the 
evidence and inferences to be made therefrom." kl 
Finally, Severson failed to allege a prima facie case that defense counsel was 
deficient for failing to object to the prosecutor's references to Mary's family. It would 
certainly be a reasonable tactical decision not to object to a prosecutor's efforts to 
humanize a victim by identifying her as a mother, daughter, and sister. Such an 
objection could easily alienate a jury especially if it appears that, by objecting, 
counsel is attempting to marginalize the victim. See Vicory, 81 S.W.3d at 731 ("It has 
long been recognized that trial counsel will often forego an objection in order to, 
among other things, avoid antagonizing the jury."). 
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The fact that counsel sought a new trial based on the prosecutor's closing 
comments relating to Severson's affair, and specifically the prosecutor's statement 
that Severson "was screwing a 21 year old tramp" (#32128 R., Vol. X, p.1802), 
demonstrates counsel believed the statement was improper but chose to wait until 
after the jury returned its verdict before raising it as an issue. Severson was not 
awarded a new trial on this (or any other basis) (#32128 R., Vol. X, pp.1821-1831), 
nor is there any basis for concluding that, had counsel objected at the time the 
statement was made, the court would have declared a mistrial nor is there a 
"reasonable probability that the jury could have acquitted if an objection had stopped 
the misconduct" (Appellant's Brief, pp.16-18). At best, the district court may have 
sustained an objection and reminded the jury, as it did on "several occasions that 
statements made by counsel were not to be regarded as evidence." Severson, 14 7 
Idaho at 721 n.35, 215 P.3d at 441 n.35. 
Because Severson failed to allege a genuine issue of material fact that 
counsel's failure to object to certain statements in the prosecutor's closing argument 
was anything but a presumptively reasonable tactical decision that properly weighed 
the potential benefits of objecting, the possible consequences of objecting, and the 
likelihood of "success" in making the objection (i.e., something more than another 
admonishment that counsel's arguments were not evidence and/or a directive to 
"disregard" the statement), and because he failed to allege a genuine issue of 
material fact that he was prejudiced by counsel's failure to do so, particularly in light 
of the Idaho Supreme Court's decision on direct appeal, he has failed to show error 
in the summary dismissal of this claim. 
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CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests this Court affirm the district court's summary 
dismissal of Severson's petition for post-conviction relief. 
DATED this 31 st day of March, 2014 . 
. ~ 
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